January 29, 1998
Contact: Lew Harris
Phone: (615) 322-2706
Email: [email protected]
Vanderbilt University sociologist studies "flower power"
NASHVILLE, Tenn. -- Where have all the "flower children" gone and how have they fared? That's a question Vanderbilt University associate sociology professor Darren Sherkat wanted to answer.
He found that the values that led millions of Americans to protest society's "establishment" in the 1960s and early 1970s have remained with them throughout their lives, influencing their career, religion, family and political choices. "I undertook the research because I wanted to know if this group had `sold out,'" Sherkat said. "Not being from that generation, I had tended to think they had. I was surprised by my findings. The majority of the former activists have not sold out and have maintained their values, though tempered in some areas. They've maintained political activism and moved to more mainstream politics. Yet they've also continued to protest when they find it necessary. They became advocates of gender equity, for example, long before anyone else." Sherkat said one of the most interesting aspects of the study is that it found fewer children born to 1960s-era activists. Given the political continuities across generations, the lack of children born to activist parents could have profound and long-lasting negative consequences for liberal political movements in the United States, according to the Vanderbilt sociologist. The study shows that former protestors--compared to non-activists--hold more liberal political orientations, are more likely to select occupations in what Sherkat calls the "new class," hold less traditional religious orientations, marry later and are less likely to have children. Included in the "new class" are artists, performing artists, journalists, lawyers, social workers, academics, librarians and clergy. Sherkat and a colleague made their conclusions after analyzing data from the Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study, which compared the same group of activists and non-protestors in 1973 and 1982. The more than 1,600 participants had been selected in 1965, when they were high school freshmen and were high school seniors by 1969. The 1973 interviews came shortly after the height of 1960's activism and the 1982 interviews occurred when the participants were in their mid-30s and well into adult life. In both 1973 and in 1982, activists remained significantly more liberal than non-activists and were much more likely to be aligned with the Democratic Party. Activists were significantly less likely than non-protestors to support Richard Nixon in 1972 and Ronald Reagan in 1980.
Protestors were significantly more educated than non-activists in both 1973 and 1982. Despite their education advantages, activists earned significantly less incomes than non-protestors in 1973. Activists did not earn significantly less than non-protestors by 1982. Twice as many activists as non-activists were employed in new class occupations in 1973 and activists were almost five times more likely to be working in new class occupations by 1982. Protestors were significantly less likely to be housewives and significantly more likely to change jobs with greater frequency than their counterparts.
Non-activists probably viewed educational and occupational resources primarily as a means to attain income, Sherkat said. In contrast, protestors may have seen educational and occupational resources as a way to sustain political orientations, promote interactions with networks of like-minded individuals and obtain political power and influence.
Activists were significantly more opposed to prayer in public schools than non-protestors in 1973 and continued to be less supportive of school prayer in 1982. They were also less likely than non-protestors to have a religious affiliation in 1973, evidencing their withdrawal from traditional religious resources. Many protestors re-established a religious identification between 1973 and 1982, but protestors were still more likely to remain unaffiliated and less active in religious groups. Protestors were significantly less prone than non-activists to be married in 1973 and still were less likely to be married in 1982, although they were significantly more likely to have married in the later period.
Protestors were less likely to have children in 1973 and significantly less likely to have children in 1982. Among those who had children, the two groups did not differ significantly in the number of children.
-VU-
RSS