As President Bush ratchets up public pressure on the United Nations to support a new resolution on Iraq, behind the scenes U.S. diplomats are making promises, cutting deals, and offering a variety of incentives to other countries. Russia, China, and France have already been assured that a decent share of the economic spoils from post-Saddam Iraq will flow to them in exchange for their votes in the Security Council. Other countries in the region will be offered similar fiscal incentives, and through secret back channels, even Iran will be promised something for cooperation -- despite its membership in the unholy trinity of the Axis of Evil. Such is the nature of international politics. Only ever steadfast Britain will act with the United States without clear strings attached, trusting that its unswerving loyalty will be rewarded with friendship and mutual respect. George W. Bush may be surprised to discover that he has one other staunch and loyal ally who requires absolutely nothing for his support for invading Iraq: Osama Bin Laden.
In the context of 20th Century world history, such a bizarre alliance is not so strange at all when ideological enemies have often joined forces with their enemies. Hitler and Stalin united for the dismemberment of Poland; Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt joined forces to defeat Hitler; and, in the quest to oppose the Kremlin's growing power during the later half of the Cold War, the Nixon-Mao dance partnership waltzed blissfully over the body bags of Korea and Vietnam. Thus, the "Bush-Bin Laden Pact" on Iraq has good company in the historic record.
We must remember that while Osama may have declared war on the United States, his real mission is to change the face of politics in the Middle East. Bin Laden acts globally but thinks locally. Al Qaeda's successful attacks on U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, the suicide attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, and the carnage of 9/11 were all designed to force the United States to withdraw from the Middle East, thereby allowing Bin Laden's radical Islamist revolution to take control of the Arab heartland. While they are supported by the USA, the "moderate" Arab potentates have proven most difficult to dislodge from power. Bin Laden cares most about Saudi Arabia and the smaller oil-rich emirates, but Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Libya, and other countries populated by Muslims in the Middle East are all targets of his pan-Arabian Islamic revival, where he seeks to recreate the idealized political dream world invented by the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Bin Laden's goal is to Talibanize all of the Arab World. He is more than happy to have American assistance in Iraq, which for decades has been one of the least Islamic and most secular countries in the region. While it is certain that George W. and Osama B. will not meet to formalize their mutual interests in ridding the world of Saddam, it is also certain that Bin Laden interests will be served in two ways. First, when the inevitable group of Iraqi women and children are killed by an American smart bomb gone awry, and Al Jazeera broadcasts television footage of their broken bodies to the Arab-speaking world, the U.S. Armed Forces become the best recruiting agents for the recently depleted ranks of Al Qaeda. Second, in addition to restocking Al Qaeda's shock troops from the ever-swelling ranks of disgruntled and radicalized youth throughout the Middle East, Bin Laden also knows that his long-term chances for a future Islamisized Iraq will be improved with George Bush's decision to oust Saddam from power.
For three decades, Saddam has been a staunch and ruthless opponent to any Islamic renewal in Iraq. Bin Laden knows that U.S. forces will quickly sweep away Saddam's forces, but how long will the American's be willing to occupy a country the size of Texas? How many years, how much money, and how many American lives will be lost before the American taxpayers force their politicians to declare victory, pack up, and go home? Indeed, what will count as a successful "regime-change" for an administration that has forsworn nation-building, demonstrating its distaste for any serious commitment to long-term political reform and regime-stability in Bosnia and Kosovo, while at the same time refusing to commit the necessary troops to Afghanistan to provide the new government of Hamid Karzai any tangible sovereignty and security outside of Kabul? Osama realizes that with Saddam's autocratic instruments of control swept away by U.S. forces, there is little likelihood that a stable government can be created amongst the deeply splintered anti-Saddam opposition groups, which have warred amongst themselves for years. In their haste for a quick and easy victory, the Americans will quickly install a new democratic government for Iraq. Osama suspects that, lacking both popular support and authoritarian instruments of power, such a government will fail. Iraq is a country with absolutely no experience with any form of government other than foreign occupiers or ruthless dictators. Creating a democratic culture in Iraq will take a commitment similar to that witnessed after World War II, when U.S. forces occupied Japan and Germany for decades, insuring domestic law and order stability while nurturing democratic institutions. Short of any similar long-term commitment, when U.S. forces withdraw, Iraq will most likely fall into chaos and civil war similar to that witnessed in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Out of the ashes of that struggle rose Osama's glorious heroes, the Taliban. Thus, when the new ashes of Baghdad blow through the hearts and minds of the world's Muslims, Osama will silently, thank George W. Bush for his timely assistance.
The history of war is scattered with the most peculiar of bedfellows, and unintended consequences routinely befall the most well planned foreign policies.
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Douglas A. Borer is the author of Superpowers Defeated:Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared (London: Frank Cass, 1999). He is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech.
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