Newswise — MANHATTAN, Kan. -- The possibility of a nuclear assault is a real threat for many countries today, including in South Asia and the Middle East.
Rabia Akhtar, a doctoral student in security studies at Kansas State University and Fulbright scholar from Pakistan, recently analyzed one component in what is an almost high-stakes blinking game between Pakistan and India. Her assessment, "NASR and Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrence -- Analysis," was published in Eurasia Review. Written for Indian policymakers, it focuses on the strategic and uneasy peace between India and Pakistan that centers on each country's nuclear weapons stock.
"Ever since nuclearization post-1998, both countries are building up their weapons because of the arms race going on in South Asia," Akhtar said. "In the case of India and Pakistan it's sort of a tit-for-tat mechanism. For example, if India were to test its missiles, Pakistan would have to test theirs to show that it's on par."
On April 19 Pakistan successfully tested its first short-range ballistic missile, named Nasr. The missile -- codenamed Hatf-IX -- can carry a nuclear warhead over a range of 37.2 miles, or 60 km. The missile is categorized as a tactical nuclear weapon, or TNW, meaning it can be used on the battlefield or in a preemptive attack. Pakistan's missile was developed to counter Cold Start, a military doctrine India developed in 2004. Cold Start states that Indian forces can conduct limited surgical strikes in Pakistan, though not to the point of crossing the nuclear threshold.
According to Akhtar, however, these tactical nuclear weapons shift the nuclear deterrence balance that exists between the two countries. Nuclear deterrence is the theory that a country's nuclear weapons supply will discourage a nuclear assault upon that country through the promise of a massive nuclear retaliation.
"The current nuclear deterrence in Pakistan is that Pakistan's nuclear weapons tend to deter India's conventional capability as well as its nuclear capability for an attack," Akhtar said. "Pakistan has always made the statement that if India were to attack, Pakistan may not just retaliate through conventional means; the conflict might cross nuclear thresholds, and then all hell would break loose."
Akhtar's paper looked at the implications these tactical nuclear weapons have for both Pakistan and India, as well as what it means for each country's nuclear deterrence efforts.
"What I found in my analysis was that it complicates the situation further and destabilizes the region," Akhtar said. "It shifts favor to India and the possibility of renewing its nuclear testing. But it also sort of conforms to India's rationale that it would not provoke Pakistan into a response because of the presence of TNWs in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal."
Though nuclear proliferation cannot be undone, Akhtar said she hopes policymakers in both India and Pakistan focus on reducing and controlling the circumstances that could lead to use of these tactical nuclear weapons.
Akhtar plans to next look at the debate on the idea that Pakistan's nuclear weapons, materials and weapons creation know-how are easily accessible to terrorist organizations and black markets.
Akhtar, who taught as an assistant professor in Pakistan, chose K-State's security studies program because it's the first in the world to offer a doctorate in this specialized field. After completing her doctorate in 2014, she plans to return to Pakistan and resume teaching.
"Being in education you actually get a chance to teach younger generations who are the future of Pakistan," Akhtar said. "I want to impart whatever knowledge I gain and whatever sense I can prevail into the younger lot -- who are going to be policymakers in coming years. As an academic, I will be investing in the future of Pakistan."
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